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Abstract 
This study is an empirical assessment of the effectiveness of state renewable energy 
policies at increasing renewable energy generation. The theory of externalities explains that 
renewable energy will be under-produced by the market without government intervention, 
justifying the importance of increased understanding of the effectiveness of various policy 
instruments. Economic theory suggests that both command and control (CAC) and market-based 
incentive (MBI) policies can be used to address this market failure and can be equally effective 
under perfect information and perfect enforcement.  In practice, standard setting and 
enforcement differ, and empirical evidence has shown that the effectiveness of the two types of 
policies differ. Additionally, it is possible that increased renewable energy generation is not only 
driven by energy policies, but also by certain economic, demographic, and political factors. 
In this study two research questions are investigated: Which policy is more effective in 
promoting increased renewable energy generation: market-based or command and control 
policies? And, what other factors affect renewable energy generation in a state? Any and all 
insights gained through the investigation of these two questions will contribute to answering the 
overarching question asked by economists, environmentalists, political scientists, and ultimately 
policymakers of which types of policies can most effectively be used to promote renewable 
energy generation? 
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Introduction  
This study is an application of environmental economic theory and econometric methods 
to the environmental issues associated with the underproduction of renewable energy. In 2015, 
35% of CO2 emissions released into the atmosphere in the U.S. were a consequence of the 
burning of fossil fuels in the electricity generation industry (U.S. EPA 2017). Replacing 
electricity generated from fossil fuels with electricity generated from renewable sources would 
address this environmental problem. However, because renewable energy is a good with positive 
externalities it is being under produced in the market. Currently, only about 8% of electricity 
generated in the US comes from non-hydro renewable sources, while over 66% comes from  
polluting fossil fuels (“EIA’s Energy in Brief: How Much U.S. Electricity Is Generated from 
Renewable Energy?” 2016). Because the root cause of this environmental problem is a market 
failure in the renewable energy industry caused by a positive externality, environmental 
economic theories and methods can be used to correct this market failure and, consequently, the 
environmental issue. Specifically, environmental economic theory can be used to model how 
government intervention, in the form of renewable energy policies, can provide a number of 
possible solutions to this problem.  
This study aims to evaluate the effectiveness of various state energy policies at increasing 
renewable energy generation. Specifically, the effectiveness of price and quantity instruments, 
both suggested by environmental economic theory to be viable policy solutions, will be explored. 
The quantity instrument, or command and control policy, analyzed in this study is a Renewable 
Portfolio Standard, hereafter referred to as an RPS policy. These common state-level policies 
“require utilities to use or procure renewable energy or renewable energy credits to account for a 
certain percentage of their retail electricity sales or a certain amount of generating capacity” 
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typically by a goal year (DSIRE, 2017). RPS policies are currently in place in 37 states; Table 1 
provides information on the existing RPS policies, their implementation dates, their renewable 
energy goals, and their goal year.  
To evaluate the effectiveness of price or market based instruments, this study uses a 
theoretical tax on fossil fuels. It is through prices that taxes (e.g., a carbon tax based on carbon 
content of fossil fuels) operate and influence firm behavior. This tax is theoretical because, 
unlike RPS policies, no such input tax exists in the United States. This unique approach uses 
fossil fuel prices as proxies to measure MBI effectiveness instead of using data from existing 
MBI policies because of their heterogeneous natures. The specific methodology used to evaluate 
policy solutions will be explained in depth later in the paper. However, it is important to note 
that the approaches used for the two different policies are distinct in one key regard. The CAC 
policy analysis in this study employs real policy data and can be used to conclude whether 
current policies are effective. Conversely, the analysis of the effectiveness of MBI policies is 
theoretical, and can inform only whether this type of policy would be effective if implemented. 
Finally, to isolate the effects of energy policies, the appropriate econometric methods are used to 
analyze renewable energy policies while controlling for several other factors that could lead to 
the differing percentages of renewable energy between states.  
The findings of this study will add to the ever-growing body of literature evaluating state-
level renewable energy policy effectiveness. While the empirical methods utilized are an 
extension of previous works, this study is unique in three significant regards. First, this paper 
will evaluate the current policies using the most up-to-date data available, whereas much of the 
existing literature was published four to eight years ago. This gap is significant because 
renewable energy policies have been adopted at a rapid rate; over 800 policies have been added 
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to the DSIRE database since 2011. At the same time, the market for renewable energy is 
evolving rapidly. Second, in addition to including all the recent policies in the data set, this study 
also includes a unique set of control variables and estimation methods found to be significant in 
previous literature. These two elements, as well as an in-depth discussion and comparison of the 
results with hypotheses based in environmental economic theory, distinguish this paper from the 
existing literature.    
Improving the understanding of renewable energy policies is critical to the design of 
effective policies that attain their intended goals. Without effective policies, renewable energy 
will continue to be under-produced in the U.S. electricity market. an outcome with catastrophic 
costs for both the environment and society. The benefits of renewable energy generation range 
from climate change mitigation to a more secure energy future. Impressive benefits such as these 
further increase the need for effective policies.  
The goal of this study is to facilitate a deeper understanding of policy effectiveness by 
answering the following two research questions. Which policies emerge as more effective in 
promoting increased renewable energy generation: market-based (MBI) or command and control 
(CAC) policies? And, what other factors affect renewable energy generation in a state? The 
answers to these two questions will be hypothesized using a theoretical framework and tested 
empirically using rich data and econometric methods. The results of this study can be leveraged 
by policymakers to improve and promote effective policies that address the market failure of the 
underproduction of renewable energy and, ultimately, the environmental problem of CO2 
pollution.    
Literature Review 
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As states continue to implement more energy policies, the body of literature evaluating 
their effectiveness is growing. Past empirical studies have evaluated the effectiveness of different 
types of policies, as well as the impact of non-policy factors on renewable energy. This study is 
most similar to the work of Shrimali and Kniefel (2011) who conclude that renewable capacity 
penetration is “driven by policy” using panel data from 1991 to 2007. This study applies similar 
methods to more recent energy policy data, but also considers the contributions of many other 
authors.  
This study also aims to clarify the inconsistent results regarding policy effectiveness 
present in the literature to date. Carley (2009), for example, finds that RPS implementation is not 
a significant predictor of the percentage of renewable energy generation, while Yin and Powers 
(2010) conclude that RPS policies have a positive and significant effect on renewable energy. 
Finally, past work was leveraged to compile a thorough list of exogenous and non-policy factors 
to also consider in the model. Namely, Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2010) find all the non-
policy factors they analyze to be positively and significantly related to renewable energy. The 
methodology used in the literature combines policy and control variables using panel data and 
then analyzes the data using a fixed-effects model (Shrimali and Kniefel 2011; Zhao, Tang, and 
Wang 2013). However, overall, the results in the literature regarding both the effectiveness of 
CAC and MBI policies as well as important non-policy factors are largely inconsistent, leaving 
many opportunities for further research.  
First, Shrimali and Kniefel (2011) use a fixed-effects model with state-specific time-
trends, including policy and non-policy explanatory variables. They model the “Nameplate 
Capacity,” also referred to as “deployment” or “capacity of the different sources of Renewable 
energy” in a given state. A unique element of their work is that they use more than one 
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dependent variable to measure the effects of policies on wind, biomass, geothermal, and solar 
capacity deployment separately. The policies they analyze in their model include: renewable 
portfolio standards (RPS), state government green power purchasing requirements, green power 
options, and clean energy funds (CEF). They predict that all policies will have a positive 
correlation with renewable energy deployment. The economic and political variables included 
are found to be “generally insignificant,” leading to the paper’s principle finding that “renewable 
capacity penetration is, to a large extent, driven by policy” (Shrimali and Kniefel 2011). They 
find that RPS are significant for each source, but negative for total energy. These surprising 
results are also found and explained further in other papers (Carley 2009; Yin and Powers 2010). 
They find CEFs to be positively significant, a result differing from previous works that find 
similar financing insignificant (Yin and Powers 2010; Menz and Vachon 2006). Green power 
options were found to be robustly significant, demonstrating the power of customer pull 
(Shrimali and Kniefel 2011). State government green power purchasing was also found 
insignificant, a result that is not yet fully understood.  
There is also literature that evaluates just one policy’s effectiveness. Many articles are 
focused solely on RPS policies; this may be due in part to their puzzling negative and 
contradictory effects across studies, or their prevalence across states. Carley (2009) evaluates 
only RPS policies and finds them “not a significant predictor” of the percentage of renewable 
energy generation (Carley 2009). This is consistent with other findings that RPS are “ineffective” 
(Shrimali and Kniefel 2011) and that RPS have a “negative effect on investments in renewable 
capacity” (Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011). Further studies of RPS by Yin and Powers (2010) 
including an “RPS stringency” variable to account for heterogeneity among states’ policies, 
reveal that more stringent RPS policies are positively and significantly correlated to renewable 
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energy deployment. Other papers confirm this positive correlation when including stringency and 
controlling for other factors (Shrimali et al. 2015). 
In the background of most of these studies are discussions of the significance and role of 
non-policy variables on renewable energy. Some papers find them insignificant (Shrimali and 
Kniefel 2011), while other papers find them significant (Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011) at 
predicting renewable energy generation. In many papers, economic, political, and demographic 
variables are used only as controls in the model (Carley 2009; Shrimali and Kniefel 2011; Yin 
and Powers 2010). However, the study by Delmas and Montes-Sancho (2011) is unique in that it 
looks at only two policies in a state, allowing them to put a larger focus on the “natural, social, 
and policy context” under which policies are adopted. In doing this, Delmas and Montes-Sancho 
(2011) find resource endowment, democratic governance, and renewable association, all non-
policy factors, to be positively and significantly related to renewable energy deployment. Delmas 
and Montes-Sancho (2011) also evaluate how economic factors like income per capita and 
unemployment affect policy implementation.   
In addition to econometric models, other types of studies provide valuable insights that 
inform this study. For example, a synthesis article written by Krey and Clarke (2011) uses 
different scenarios to model the role of renewable energy in climate change mitigation. They 
investigate what future levels of renewable energy deployment are consistent with different CO2 
concentration goals. They conclude that “we should be planning for futures with substantially 
more… renewable energy than we have today” (Krey and Clarke 2011). This article and other 
similar works support the idea that renewable energy is a good with quantifiable external benefits 
that will not be produced at the socially optimal quantity without effective policy intervention.  
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Finally, theory also provides important frameworks for evaluating policy effectiveness. 
Environmental economic theory, as explained in environmental economic textbooks, provides 
the foundation for this study (Callan and Thomas 2013; Field and Field 2013). Theory will be 
utilized in this paper to make hypotheses, analyze the significance of the findings, and draw 
meaningful conclusions about how policy outcomes differ in theory and in practice. Overall, 
even a brief summary of the relevant past literature reveals many nuances in the methods and 
focuses of the previous works. The lack of consistent results prompt further research on this 
topic. 
Theoretical Framework 
 Before any econometric analysis was conducted, a theoretical framework was 
constructed. This framework facilitates a better understanding of the electricity market, the 
environmental problem being addressed, and potential policy solutions. These models are 
constructed under the assumptions of perfect information and enforcement because they allow 
the models to represent the “socially optimal” level of renewable energy, even though this 
quantity is not known.  
  First, to construct a market model for the electricity market, a few additional simplifying 
assumptions were made. It is assumed that electricity can be generated from only two sources: 
fossil fuels sources and renewable sources. It is also assumed that electrical energy generated 
from renewable sources is a perfect substitute for electricity generated from fossil fuels. Lastly, it 
is assumed the amount of electricity generation remains constant and is equal to fossil fuel 
generation plus renewable energy generation, i.e., an increase in one source results in an 
equivalent decrease in the other. After these assumptions are made, the graphs seen in Figure 1 
can be used to model the electricity industry.   
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The graphs shown in Figure 1 are representative of market graphs commonly used in 
environmental economics. Instead of supply and demand, they use MB and MC curves, but they 
represent the same underlying market relationships. The x-axis and y-axis represent the quantity 
and price of the good being modeled, respectively. In these graphs, the MC, or marginal cost 
curve represents the supply relationship, in which quantity supplied increases as price increases. 
The MB, or marginal benefit curve represents the demand relationship, wherein the quantity 
demanded is negatively related to price. The private market equilibrium is the point at which the 
two curves intersect, indicated by Q* and P*(Field and Field 2013).  
Figure 1 
 
Now that a base model has been created, the environmental problem can be modeled using 
this framework. To do this, renewable energy is defined as a good with positive externalities. It 
can be classified this way because when electricity is generated from renewable sources, the 
negative environmental impacts of fossil fuel generation (greenhouse gases, namely CO2) are 
forgone, which is a positive externality or “environmental benefit.” The theory of externalities 
explains that a good with positive externalities will be under produced by the market (Field and 
Field 2013). This relationship can be seen in Figure 2. 
	   12 
 In this figure, the external benefit is represented as a shift in the private MB curve (MBp) to 
the social MB curve (MBs) in the amount of the positive externality. The new socially optimal 
quantity is indicated by Qs. For renewable energy, it is less than the private quantity indicated by 
Q*. This shows that renewable energy is under-produced. The opposite scenario is modeled for 
fossil fuel generation, which is a good with a negative externality. This negative externality 
represents the environmental costs associated with the pollution that results from the burning of 
fossil fuels. This associated cost is represented as an upward shift in the MC curve from the 
private (MCp) to the to the social MC curve (MCs). Fossil fuels are overproduced (Q* < Qs) 
because the external costs are not captured in their price.  
Figure 2 
 
This framework helps to explain how policies can be used as a tool to correct market 
failures, thus increasing the quantity of renewable energy generation. Environmental policies are 
typically grouped into two main categories: quantity and price instruments. In this study, one of 
each is evaluated. Theoretical frameworks exist to explain how these two groups of policies can 
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achieve their desired goals and, in the context of this study, increase renewable energy 
generation.  
The category of quantity instruments can also be defined as command and control (CAC) 
or regulatory policies that mandate and enforce levels of desired behaviors. The example of a 
CAC policy evaluated in this study is a Renewable Portfolio Standard. RPS policies require a 
specific quantity or percentage of energy to be generated from renewable energy sources. Under 
perfect information, an RPS will be set at the optimal level of renewable electricity, thereby 
increasing renewable energy generation. If there is perfect enforcement, this quantity regulation 
can be depicted as a vertical line that intersects the social MB curve at the socially optimal level 
of Q*. While it is nearly impossible to know what the socially optimal level is without having 
perfect information, the goal of this study is simply to test if RPS policies, in fact, increase 
renewable energy from the market equilibrium towards this socially optimal level (Callan and 
Thomas 2013). RPS policies apply to the market for renewable energy generation and are shown 
in the graph on the left side of Figure 3. 
Figure 3  
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The category of price instruments can also be called market based incentives (MBI) or 
financial incentives, wherein regulators influence prices, but firms make their own decisions 
about the quantity of energy to produce in light of market conditions. The example of this type of 
policy evaluated in this study is a theoretical input tax on fossil fuels. This tax would be applied 
in the market for fossil fuel-generated electricity because this is the good with the negative 
externality that policymakers seek to decrease. Graphically, the tax can be represented as an 
upward shift in the MC curve of fossil fuels by the tax amount that would result in a higher price 
of fossil fuels. The law of demand explains that if the price of a good increases, the quantity 
demanded should decrease. Therefore, a tax on fossil fuel should result in a reduction in quantity 
demanded for electricity from these sources. Under perfect information about the extent of the 
negative externality, the tax can be set such that the price increase will result in the socially 
optimal level of fossil fuels. Assuming the demand for all electricity remains the same, the 
decrease in generation from fossil fuels is translated to an increase in demand (MB) from 
renewable energy, via the substitution effect (Callan and Thomas 2013). This tax is applied in 
the market for fossil fuel generation, but the quantity increase can be seen in the market for 
renewable energy generation. This is shown in the graphs in Figure 3. Again, this study will not 
base policy effectiveness on the attainment of a specific socially optimal level, but rather on 
whether the policy moves the quantity of renewable energy generation in a positive direction. 
Overall, these theories are critical to this study because they allow for the development of 
hypotheses regarding the effect of the policies of interest on the dependent variable. They also 
serve as a point of comparison for determining if a policy is effective or not, because the 
theoretical predictions about how a policy should work can be contrasted against what is 
observed in the data. This framework will be referenced throughout the study.   
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One shortcoming of these models, however, is that they rely on assumptions of perfect 
information and perfect enforcement, as well as simplifying assumptions about the renewable 
energy market. These assumptions are not realistic, which is why these models are only helpful 
in making hypotheses. However, in empirical analysis, additional factors need to be considered 
when analyzing renewable energy policy effectiveness. The inclusion of political, economic, and 
demographic variables serve the purpose of capturing these other factors in empirical analysis.  
Data and Hypotheses 
Data Structure 
The empirical analysis in this study utilizes data on the variables listed below, collected 
for all 50 states from the years 2000 to 2014. Because the data exists and was collected for n 
different entities observed at T different time periods, it is called longitudinal or panel data. 
(Stock and Watson 2011). Data was successfully collected for each state for each year. 
Therefore, the panel is strongly balanced and there are 700 unique observations (n x T). 
Together, the 700 observations comprise a “short” panel with a large n of 50 states, compared to 
a relatively short T of 14 years (Park 2011). 
Variable Definitions and Hypotheses  
Below are descriptions of each of the variables used in this study and their hypothesized 
sign. Tables 1, 2, and 3 provide more detailed information about the variables. Table 2 contains 
variable definitions, units, transformations, sources and their hypothesized signs. Table 3 
contains summary statistics. Table 1 contains details about RPS policies in different states to 
accompany the RPS policy variable.  
Dependent Variable   
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The dependent variable in this study is denoted as REN. REN is defined as the logged 
percentage of net electrical energy generated in a state from renewable sources. Specifically, it is 
calculated by dividing the quantity of electricity generated from renewable sources (wind, solar, 
biomass and geothermal) in thousand megawatt hours by total net energy generation. This 
accounts for energy generated in all sectors; electric power (electric utilities and independent 
power producers), commercial, and industrial. It should be noted that hydropower is excluded 
because most of the existing capacity was installed between 1930 and 1980. There is less 
potential for growth in this industry compared to other renewables. Additionally, not all states’ 
RPS policies define hydropower as a “renewable,” affecting its eligibility in counting towards 
RPS goals (Uria-Martinez, O’Connor, and Johnson 2015). The exclusion of hydroelectric is 
common in the literature (Carley 2009; Shrimali and Kniefel 2011; Delmas and Montes-Sancho 
2011).  
Net Generation of Renewable Energy is used as the outcome variable because it is 
believed to be the best indicator of the increase in generation of electricity from renewable 
sources as a result of energy policies. It is also used as a dependent variable in a study by Carley 
(2009). Other authors have measured “renewable energy” using “capacity” variables that 
measure “the amount of capacity the generator produces under ideal conditions” or “the 
maximum rated output of all units owned per utility” (Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011; 
Shrimali and Kniefel 2011).  This variable is similar to this study’s dependent variable REN in 
that it indicates if a state has increased renewable energy generation activities within that state, 
instead of attempting to comply with RPS policies by purchasing RECs or energy generated 
elsewhere. However, capacity is not guaranteed to equal generation. Even if infrastructure is in 
place in a state, it may not always be utilized to its full capacity, e.g., for cost reasons. This offers 
	   17 
a justification for the use of net generation as a better indicator of renewable energy use in the 
day-to-day electricity market. Increasing renewable energy capacity is in line with policy goals. 
However, for renewable energy to make a difference in environmental issues, it must be used to 
replace generation from fossil fuels, which this variable does not capture. Some authors also use 
just the amount of generation from a given renewable energy source in megawatt hours (Carley 
2009). This absolute generation variable is flawed because it may capture generation increases as 
a result of energy demands as time goes on, and will not indicate if the percent of energy coming 
from renewable sources has increased states’ generation portfolios. This information is critical to 
achieve environmental goals, and is often specified by renewable energy policies like RPSs. For 
these reasons, the dependent variable REN, measuring the logged percent of net generation in a 
state from renewable energy is used.   
Independent Variables  
Policy Variables  
There are three main policy variables included in the base model of this study. They 
include RPS, coal price, and natural gas price. RPS is the quantity instrument, the CAC variable.  
It is denoted as a categorical variable that takes on a value of 1 on the year it was adopted by the 
state in all succeeding years; it is 0 otherwise. In the first year of the study, 2001, nine states had 
RPS policies. By the end of the study, 37 states in the sample had adopted an RPS, meaning this 
variable captures 28 policy changes in various years (see Table 1). This variable is hypothesized 
to have a positive sign based on environmental economic theory and past results. While past 
results have indicated inconsistent support for the effectiveness of RPS policies, the hypothesis 
in this study is that they will be effective, because they are a command and control policy that, in 
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theory, will result in increased renewable electricity generation within a given state if adopted, 
holding all other factors constant. 
 Coal price and natural gas price are proxies for price instruments, or MBIs. While there 
are many market-based instruments in practice such as Feed in Tariffs, Public Benefit funds, or 
other financial incentives, including tax incentives, grants, loans, rebates, and production 
incentives (Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011; Menz and Vachon 2006), many of them are 
specific to one type of renewable (e.g., solar, wind) or are targeted to households and not to 
generators of electricity. Because current MBI policies are very heterogeneous across states, this 
study uses a different approach.  
In the theoretical framework described earlier in this paper, the market for electricity has 
been defined as having two main inputs that are perfect substitutes: renewable sources and fossil 
fuels. Using this logic, environmental economic theory would suggest that an increase in price of 
either fossil fuel generation input (coal or natural gas) should result, via the substitution effect, in 
an increase in generation from renewable energy. Thus, coal price and natural gas price are the 
avenues through which fossil fuel taxes will be felt in the renewable and non-renewable markets. 
  A similar method of a counterfactual is used in a paper by Jaffe and Stavins, who model 
how a theoretical electricity tax affects green technology diffusion. The authors of this paper use 
price of a relevant good, electricity price, as a proxy for an MBI or tax. They interpret the 
responsiveness of the good in question to the change in a relevant price as the expected effect of 
a tax on that good (Jaffe and Stavins 1995). This method was employed instead of including a 
real tax variable in their model because one did not exist in practice. In the electricity market, 
while other MBI policies are in place, they are very heterogeneous across states and are difficult 
to model, resulting in inconsistent findings in the literature. In this study, like in the Jaffe and 
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Stavins (1995) paper, the tax in this study is a theoretical tax. However, it can still be used to 
gain an understanding of if and how the renewable electricity generation would react to a change 
in the price of fossil fuel inputs. In this study, the hypotheses being tested through the inclusion 
of the coal and natural gas price variables are that they are relevant prices in the renewable 
electricity industry and also that, according to environmental economic theory, a tax (MC 
increase) on these substitutes should result in an increase in renewable electricity generation. Put 
simply, we expect these prices to have a positive relationship with REN. 
Four additional variables are added in later empirical analyses to further disentangle and 
explain the effects of these policy variables on renewable energy. They include RPS Experience, 
Lagged Fossil Fuel generation, Lagged Coal Generation, and Lagged Natural Gas Generation. 
These variables are included in the later models to allow for an even more in-depth analysis of 
CAC and MBI policy effectiveness.   
The variable RPS Experience is an experience variable that simply takes the value of 1 
the first year a state has a policy, then 2 the second, and so on, for all years the state has a policy. 
It is hypothesized to be positive and represent “learning by doing” or, that states get better at 
renewable energy the longer they have an RPS policy. The log of this variable is used to show 
that even though states may get better at renewable energy generation, the marginal return to 
each year of the policy diminishes as they approach their goal.  The fossil fuel generation 
variables are included in later studies as additional controls for technological constraints facing 
the states in terms of switching from fossil fuel to renewable energy sources.  They allow for 
testing the hypothesis that the quantity of a substitute used in the past could proxy for 
technological stickiness and can have a negative relationship with renewable energy. It should 
also be noted that these generation variables are lagged values and are expressed in terms of 
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absolute generation or, thousand megawatt hours, while REN is the logged percent of renewable 
energy to avoid any collinearity problems.    
Non-policy Variables  
 Due to imperfect information and imperfect enforcement, the comparison of CAC and 
MBI effectiveness also must include controls for other factors that may influence how these 
policies are designed or implemented.  The non-policy variables included in this study can be 
grouped into three categories: economic, political and demographic. The economic variables 
include household income, population and electricity price.  Their definitions are self-
explanatory and they are hypothesized to be positive. The demographic variable Sierra Club 
Mem is the percentage of a state’s population that are members of the Sierra Club. The Sierra 
Club is the nation's largest and most influential grassroots environmental organization and, 
therefore, is a proxy for how liberal and environmentally-minded a state’s population is. It is 
hypothesized to be positively related to renewable energy (SCC 2016).  Finally, the political 
variable in this study is LCV Score. The League of Conservation Voters, or LCV, is a political 
advocacy organization that computes and compiles annual scores based on a scale of 0 to 100 by 
dividing the number of pro-environment votes cast by the total number of votes scored (LCV 
2016). These scores are based on “the most important issues of the year, including energy, global 
warming, public health, public lands and wildlife conservation, and spending for environmental 
programs” (LCV 2016). This score serves as a good indicator of how liberal and environmentally 
minded a state’s government officials are and is hypothesized to be positive.   
Methodology   
All analysis in this study was done using the balanced panel data set described above and 
the statistical computing package STATA 14. Both time- and entity-fixed effects estimation 
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methods were used to estimate models for analysis in this study. Employing the proper 
estimation method is especially critical to obtaining accurate unbiased results when dealing with 
panel data.  
The time- and entity-fixed effects methods were chosen only after analyzing and 
comparing other panel data estimation methods and conducting statistical tests to uncover the 
nature of the relationships between variables in the unique data used in the study. These 
methods are also used widely by other authors who have conducted similar analyses on panel 
data, further validating this approach. Namely, various combinations of entity- and time-fixed 
effects are used by (Shrimali and Kniefel 2011; Carley 2009; Shrimali et al. 2015) in related 
studies. 
 Because selecting the correct estimation method was both critical to obtaining accurate 
results and informative about the relationships between variables in the data, the first sections of 
the results section, Results R.1 and R.2, recount and discuss the model selection process. Results 
R.1 includes the steps used in determining that Fixed Effects is more appropriate than pooled 
OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) or Random Effects estimation given the data. Results R.2 builds 
on the Fixed Effects model from the findings in Results Section R.1 and details how and why 
time Fixed Effects were included in future models.  
Entity-Fixed Effects  
Entity-Fixed Effects regression (also referred to as “Fixed Effects” or “state-Fixed 
Effects” in the context of this study) controls for time-invariant unobservable factors that vary 
across entities (states) over all time periods, (𝛼i) that may be correlated with the explanatory or 
independent variables of interest (Stock and Watson 2011). Fixed-effects examines individual 
differences as intercepts, assuming the same slopes and constant variance across states (Park 
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2011). Including entity-specific effects as part of the intercept is necessary when they are time-
invariant and correlated with the regressors. When entity-effects of this nature are included in the 
model as part of the intercept rather than ignoring them (pooled OLS) or including them in the 
error term (Random Effects), the violation of key assumptions is avoided. Fixed effects 
estimation in this case allows the errors to remain independent and identically distributed with an 
expected value of zero and the other coefficients in the model to remain free from omitted 
variable bias (Park 2011).  
There are many ways to control for fixed effects using different estimation techniques. 
This study uses the “within” effect estimation method. The “within” regression estimation 
technique uses the variation within each group entity from their mean over time, to capture and 
control for entity effects. This estimation technique yields the same result as the more common 
least squares dummy variable model (LSDV), wherein entity effects are controlled for by 
including entity dummies in the model. It was chosen in this study because it is simpler to 
compute than LSDV and yields the same coefficients without resulting in the loss of degrees of 
freedom that occurs when a large number of variables are included in the model. This is 
particularly important when the panel data is short and has a large “n” (number of states) because 
that means that 49 dummies variables would need to be included in every model.  
The only limitation to using the within estimator instead of the LSDV method is that 
time-invariant variables are dropped from the model. They are not captured in this type of 
estimation because they have the same value over the entire sample, meaning they do not vary 
around their mean, 𝑥# − 𝑥% = 0. Fortunately, this is not an issue in this study because this study 
does not include any strictly time-invariant variables. The only ramification of using the within 
estimator is that the RPS variable can only be interpreted for states that experience a policy 
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implementation during the years included in the model in the study (28/37 states). This has a 
minimal impact because most of the states that have an RPS policy, implemented it during the 
time period analyzed in this study, see Table 1. The within regression estimator is equation is:  
(yit −yi)= β(xit −xi) +(εit −εi) 
Using this method to control for entity-effects allows the results to reflect the effect of the 
independent variables of interest (policy variables) included in the model on the dependent 
variable (REN) without confounding them with the effects of unobservable factors.  In the 
context of this study the entity-effects we are controlling for are state-effects that are time-
invariant unique characteristics of a state that are correlated with the outcome and/or predictor 
variables. One possible example of a time-invariant state-effect that would bias the model if not 
included could be state environmental preferences or natural resource endowment. (Carley 2009; 
Shrimali and Kniefel 2011). For example, if a state has plentiful coal resources this may be 
correlated with the dependent variable: REN making that state less likely to generate energy 
from renewable sources; and/or it could be correlated with one or many independent variables in 
the model, Coal price, for example. While it is impossible to say exactly what these state-effects 
are because they are unobservable; using the within fixed effects estimator includes them so they 
do not bias the other coefficients in the model.  
Time-Fixed Effects  
In a similar manner to how entity-fixed effects estimation controls for entity effects that 
are time-invariant but differ between entities, the use of time-fixed effects controls for variables 
that are constant across entities but evolve over time (Stock and Watson 2011). These time 
effects have the same impact on all states but change over the course of time, and, in the identical 
way entity effects do, they can bias the model by being correlated with the explanatory 
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and/or independent variables of interest if not controlled for properly. Temporal variation in the 
dependent variable may be captured by simply including a “time” trend variable in the equation.  
One example of a time-varying factor that affects all states equally is federal energy 
policy. If a federal energy policy, for example, a subsidy, was adopted in the middle of this 
study, it would represent a change in a time-varying factor that would apply to all states equally. 
Additionally, it would likely be correlated with the dependent variable REN and/or other 
independent variables. Technological change is also a good example of a time-varying factor; as 
time goes on, renewable energy technology improves and becomes more efficient and less 
expensive, affecting all states equally.  
Base model estimation equation (Including both time and entity-fixed effects): 
 
RENit = ∑ 𝛽1PCACit + 𝛽2PMBIit + 𝛽 𝑍it  + 𝜆t+(𝛼+ 𝛼i) + uit 
RENit  -  dependent variable: log percent of renewable energy generation  
Pcacit  - independent policy variable of interest: vector of RPS policy variables 
Pmbiit  - independent policy variable of interest: vector of coal and natural gas variables 
Zit  - control variables: vector of economic, political, and demographic variables (𝛼+ 𝛼i) – state specific intercept: entity-fixed effects  𝜆t – time variable: time-fixed effects 
i-state index 
t -year index 
 
Results 
The results section of this paper is divided into three sections, Results R.1, R.2, and R.3. 
In results section R.1, the process for selecting an appropriate panel data estimation method 
through the analysis of the cross-sectional dimension of the panel is discussed. The results are in 
Table 4. The results of that table are discussed in detail below, but they suggest using the fixed-
effects model. Table 5 displays only fixed-effects models and explores the role of time-varying 
factors by analyzing the time series dimension of the panel, described in detail in section R.2. 
Finally, section R.3 discusses and builds on the correctly-specified model, indicated from the 
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specification tests explored in sections R.1 and R.2. These findings are reported in Table 6. All 
models in Table 6 properly control for both entity- and time-fixed effects. Therefore, the 
coefficients of the variables of interest are interpreted in context with the research questions and 
additional variables are added to further understand the significant finings.  
Results R.1 
In Table R1, four models explain REN, the log percent of renewable energy generation, 
as a function of the same independent variables RPS, coal price, natural gas price, population, 
median HH income, Sierra Club mem, and LCV score, respectively. These variables make up the 
base model and are the same in all four model specifications. However, the models differ in 
estimation method. Each of these models was used to gain a better understanding of the 
relationships in the data. Specifically, they specify what relationship, if any, exists between the 
unobservable entity or state effects and the independent and dependent variables.   
Model 1 is the result of pooled OLS estimation. Pooled OLS estimation ignores the panel 
structure of the data by simply regressing the independent variables on the dependent variable 
irrespective of the state and year from which the data was collected. Pooled OLS is estimated 
using the following equation: 
RENit = 𝛼+ 𝛽1Xit+...+βKxi + uit 
OLS regression is an appropriate method to use with panel data only if certain 
assumptions are met. The standard OLS assumptions are critical to obtaining accurate results 
(Park 2011; Schmidheiny 2016; Stock and Watson 2011). 
The OLS assumptions: 
1.   Linearity: the dependent variable (REN) is a linear function of the vector of 
independent variables plus a random error term uit. 
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2.   Exogenous Error: uit is an idiosyncratic error term with and expected value of 
zero, E[uit] = 0. It is not correlated with the explanatory variables, and most 
importantly uit is uncorrelated with the individual specific effect. E[αi] = 0. 
3.   Error Variance: the variance of the errors (uit)…  
a.   are homoscedastic, constant over the sample,  
b.   and not auto-correlated , not related with one another.  
4.   Independence: All variables (Yit, Xit) are independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d); accomplished through random sampling. 
5.   No Multicollinearity: no exact linear relationship exists between independent 
variables.  
These OLS assumptions will be true only if there are no entity-fixed (or time-fixed 
effects, discussed later) present in the data. If entity-fixed effects are present in the data but not 
controlled for in the model, they would be captured in the error term, resulting in the violation of 
assumptions 2 and 3. It is plausible that there would be some entity-fixed effects present in the 
model, given that the data is from 50 unique states over 14 different years; these state-fixed 
effects, if ignored, would result in the failure to meet the OLS assumptions. This suspicion can 
be objectively tested using the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test. The null 
hypothesis of this test is that entity-specific error variance components are zero (E[αi] = 0), and 
the alternative is that they are not zero. Pooled OLS is appropriate only if the null hypothesis is 
true (Breusch and Pagan 1980; Park 2011). 
The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) test was performed after estimating Model 
2 using the Random Effects estimator, and can be found at the bottom of Table 4. The result of 
this test is a chibar2 statistic of chibar2 = 1501.80 with the corresponding p-value of p<0.0001.  
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The p-value is less than the alpha level of .05, so the null hypothesis is rejected, indicating that 
there are state-specific fixed-effects present in the data and random effects estimation is more 
appropriate than pooled OLS (Torres-Reyna 2007). 
Once state effects were identified, further analysis was needed to identify the nature of 
the heteroscedasticity between states present in the data. Specifically, it must be determined 
whether the unobservable state effects are correlated with the explanatory variables or are not 
correlated with the explanatory variables. If the state effects are not correlated with the 
regressors they are considered “random” and can be modeled using a random effects model. 
When the model is estimated using random effects the individual-specific effects (𝛼i) are random 
variables that are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and (𝛼i) state-specific effects 
become part of the error term ℇit = (αi + uit) (Schmidheiny 2016; Park 2011).The random effects 
equation is: 
RENit =  𝛽1Xit+...+βKxi + ℇit , Where ℇit = (αi + uit) 
Model 2 shows the results of random effects estimation using the above equation. If the 
state effects are correlated with the x-variables, the random effects method is appropriate. 
However, if this is not true, fixed-effects estimation should be used. In fixed-effects estimation, 
the individual-specific effects (𝛼i) are not random and are correlated with the explanatory 
variables, instead of being part of the error term. The (𝛼i) state-specific effects should be 
included in the model as intercepts (𝛼 +𝛼i). Including unique state intercepts in the model is 
critical to avoiding omitted variable bias, because the 𝛼i captures any leftover variation in the 
dependent variable that is not captured by the regressors (Xs) (Stock and Watson 2011). The 
equation used to estimate fixed-effects is:  
RENit =  𝛽1Xit+...+βKxi + (α +αi) + uit 
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In order to determine whether random or fixed-effects were more appropriate, a Hausman 
Test can be used. The Hausman test objectively determines whether state effects are correlated 
with the other variables in the model. The Hausman test accomplishes this by comparing the 
coefficients produced by both random and fixed-effects estimations of the same model and tests 
to see if the difference in the coefficients is systematic or random. The null hypothesis is that the 
difference in coefficients is not systematic, the errors are not correlated with explanatory 
variables, suggesting that random effects is appropriate. The alternative hypothesis is that the 
difference in coefficients is systematic, the errors are correlated with explanatory variables and 
fixed-effects should be used (Schmidheiny 2016; Torres-Reyna 2007; Park 2011). 
The Hausman Test is applied to compare Models 2 (Random Effects) and Model 3 (Fixed 
Effects) and the result displayed at the bottom of Table 4 is a chi2 statistic, chi2 = 83.53 with the 
corresponding p-value of p<0.0001.  The p-value is less than the alpha level of .05, so the null 
hypothesis is rejected, indicating that fixed-effects is the most appropriate estimator of state-
fixed effects present in the panel data (detailed explanation in the methodology section). As a 
result of this finding, all future models will need to control for state-specific fixed-effects to yield 
accurate results. 
There are a variety of estimation methods that control for entity-specific effects. The 
most common is the least squares dummy variable model (LSDV) where state dummy variables 
are included to control for the state-effects. This is problematic for panels with large “n” or 
number of groups (50 states), which is very large compared to only 14 years. The consequence of 
including a large number of variables in the model is loss of degrees of freedom, as well as the 
“incidental parameter problem which causes coefficients of individual effects to be inaccurate 
while the estimates of regressors are consistent” (Park 2011; Baltagi and Chang 1994). While 
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LCVD may not be ideal for samples with large “n,” it is simple to estimate, and can be found in 
Appendix A.1 (note: the coefficients on the individual state dummies are likely to be incorrect, 
but the other coefficients are the same as the coefficients found when using other equivalent 
fixed-effects estimators). To avoid potential problems associated with the LSDV model, a 
method called the “within” estimator was employed in this study. This method of estimation of 
fixed-effects does not required dummies, but instead the variation is measured for each state 
separately compared to its mean (Park 2011) (see methodology for further details). Model 3 was 
estimated using the “within” fixed-effects estimator. 
Finally, Model 4 is an even more refined version of Model 3. It is estimated using the 
“within” fixed-effects as well as robust standard errors. The use of cluster-robust standard errors 
controls for both heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of the error term that is often present 
when using fixed-effects estimators (Schmidheiny 2016). In order to confirm whether 
heteroscedasticity was present in the model, a Modified Wald test for group-wise 
heteroscedasticity was conducted. The null hypothesis of the test is that the error term is  
homoscedastic (Torres-Reyna 2007). The results of the test are displayed at the bottom of Table 
4 and indicate that the null hypothesis should be rejected because the corresponding p-value of 
the chi2 test statistic of chi2 = 4315.43, is less than the alpha level of .05. In conclusion, Model 4 
emerges as the most appropriate model to control for state-fixed effects as well as 
heteroscedasticity and will serve as the base model for all further analysis. 
Analysis of the individual coefficients themselves will be reserved for when the model is 
completely specified. While Model 4 controls for state-fixed effects and is robust, this only 
addresses the “cross-sectional” dimension of our panel, leaving the “time series” dimension to be 
explored in R.2. The identification of the fixed-effects model as the most appropriate model 
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leads to the conclusion that there are state-effects present in this type of data that effect the 
dependent variable (REN) or regressors in the model. The importance and policy implications of 
this finding will be interpreted in the context of the research questions in Results R.3. 
Results R.2 
Continuing to build on Model 4 from Table 4, Table 5 contains results from the models 
used to determine how to appropriately control for any time-fixed effects that may be present in 
the panel data (Model 4 in this table is identical to Model 4 from Table 4, simply reproduced for 
ease of comparison). In panel data, temporal effects are included in the model to control for 
variables that are constant across entities but evolve over time. First, in Model 5, a simple linear 
time-trend variable is included to test if any time-fixed effects are present, given the current base 
fixed-effects model. The variable is called “Trend,” and it takes the value of 1 for the first year, 2 
for the second, and so on, for all 14 years in the sample. The estimated coefficient of Trend is 
positive and significant, and its magnitude shows how much REN increases for every year that 
passes between 2002 and 2014, all other things held constant. This means that renewable energy 
generation would have increased over the time period captured in our sample, even if there was 
no change in the independent variables. Examples of time-varying effects that can apply to all 
states include exogenous technological change or federal policies. Thus, we need to control for 
these time effects, so as not to let them confound the effects of other variables on REN. 
 Using a linear time trend variable is an improvement on the base model, however it may 
be an oversimplification of the true effect of time on percent renewable energy generation. 
Including Trend to control for time is limiting, because it imposes that the effect of each year on 
REN is the same for each year, whereas, in reality, this may not be the case. The time-fixed 
effect may vary from year to year. In Model 6, this oversimplification is corrected for by 
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including the 12 year dummies separately in the model. It should be noted that the first year in 
the study, 2001, is not included because it is lost to allow lagged independent variables. The year 
2002 is omitted from this model to serve as a point of comparison for the other year dummy 
variables included in the model, and avoid perfect multicollinearity between the included year 
dummies. The coefficients on each year dummy variable can be interpreted as the time-fixed 
effect of that year on percent renewable energy generation. 
 A closer analysis of the coefficients in Model 6 reveals more information about the 
nature of the time trends. First, all year dummies that are significant are positive, confirming the 
positive time trend found in Model 5. But, it is also revealed that, in general, the time variables 
become positive and significant only in 2010 and subsequent years. This may indicate a break in 
2010. As a result of this discovery in Model 7, only year dummy variables from “Period 2,” 
years 2010 to 2014, are included, and the omitted time period is “Period 1,” years 2003-2009. 
The remaining year dummy coefficients can now be interpreted as the change in percent 
renewable energy generation due to time-fixed effects with respect to the omitted time Period 1.   
The inclusion of only the significant time dummy variables to control for the time-fixed 
effects present in the data was justified by performing a variety of linear hypothesis tests (F-
tests) on Models 6 and 7 that confirmed three things: 
1.    All the year dummies are jointly significant as shown by a joint hypothesis test, and 
rejecting the null hypothesis that all the year dummies are equal to zero. The results 
are located in Table 5 below Model 6.   
2.   Period 1 year dummies are jointly insignificant as shown by a joint hypothesis test, 
and rejecting the null hypothesis that all the year dummies in Period 1 (2003-2009) 
are equal to zero. The results are located in Table 5 below Model 6.  
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3.   Period 2 year dummies are jointly significant as shown by a joint hypothesis test, 
and failing to reject the null hypothesis that all the year dummies in Period 2 (2010-
2014) are equal to zero. The results are located in Table 5 below Model 6.  
Further, each of the year dummies in Period 2 have significantly different effects on REN 
and, therefore, should be included in the model separately. This was concluded after testing a 
number of hypotheses to determine that the Period 2 dummies are not only individually different 
from the omitted year (2002), but also generally from each other. Results are below Model 7.  
In addition to being statistically justified, it is beneficial to the overall significance of the 
model to remove insignificant years because including extra insignificant variables in the model 
decreases the degrees of freedom making it harder to isolate the true significance of the 
independent variables of interest.  
The conclusion reached in this result section is that Model 7 is fully and correctly 
specified and will be the base model for all further analysis in this study. To review, Model 7 
employs the correct estimation method, within fixed-effects, to control for state-fixed effects. iIt 
includes the appropriate year dummies to control for time-fixed effect and it is corrected for 
cluster robust standard errors, allowing for accurate analysis of the coefficients on the 
independent variables of interest. Detailed analysis of the coefficients of interest included in the 
model will occur in the final results section R.3.  
Results R.3 
This section describes the results found in Table 6. Table 6 contains three new models 
and two models, Models 4 and 7, that have been previously discussed in the results sections R.1 
and R.2, where they were used to determine the most accurate estimation method given the data. 
In this section, interpretations of the resulting coefficients will be discussed in the context of this 
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study’s research questions. The additional models that appear in Table 6 and Models 8, 9 and 10 
are extensions that build on Model 7. In these models, additional variables are added to the base 
model in order to further examine the effectiveness of the command and control and market 
based policies being evaluated as well as promote a deeper understanding of the important forces 
at play in the market for renewable energy.  
Overall, this empirical analysis yielded many significant results that, when interpreted, 
can be used to answer the research questions asked by this study. Altogether, the results reveal 
how the market for renewable electricity responds to a number of policy and non-policy forces. 
In this section, I will describe how the results above can be used to answer the following research 
questions: What types of policies emerge as more effective in promoting increased renewable 
energy generation, market-based or command and control policies? What role do state- and time-
specific effects play in influencing how CAC and MBI policies explain REN? And, What non-
policy factors affect renewable energy generation in a state?   
State-and Time-Specific Effects  
To begin, the findings from Models 4 and 7, used initially in determining the underlying 
patterns in the data, will be discussed as these models both demonstrate how appropriately 
controlling for state- and time-specific effects influences the magnitude, sign and significance of 
the coefficients of the CAC and MBI policy variables. Through the exercise of model 
specification, two important exogenous factors were identified, and each will be discussed in 
turn.  
First, it is confirmed that state-level characteristics lead to differences in renewable 
electricity generation in between states. Model 4 is a fixed-effects model, which, after a series of 
tests, was selected over random effects and pooled OLS models. In the context of the study, 
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finding fixed-effects present in the data indicates the importance of the contribution of unique 
state characteristics to determining a state’s renewable electricity generation. These state-fixed 
effects affect renewable electricity generation in each state differently, whereas other variables 
have similar effects across states. This is not a surprising finding and confirms preconceived 
notions that U.S. states are different, and therefore might generate different levels of renewable 
electricity. While these factors are controlled for in this analysis, the finding has important policy 
implications. Because these state effects are not characteristics that policymakers can necessarily 
observe or measure about a state or directly change to promote renewable energy generation, it 
suggests that policies may work differently in each state because of these characteristics. It also 
provides an explanation as to why the current policy landscape may be dominated by 
heterogeneous state-level policies and fewer federal policies. Ignoring state-specific effects and 
ignoring heteroscedasticity in Table 4 (Models 2 to 3 versus Model 4) show that RPS has a 
higher coefficient, coal price has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, and that 
natural gas price has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. This suggests that if 
unobserved state-specific effects were unaccounted for, one may be led to believe that RPS is 
more effective than it really is and that coal is a substitute for renewable energy, but natural gas 
is a complement, when in reality in the properly specified model, we find the opposite 
relationship to be true. 
Second, time-varying factors affect renewable electricity generation in all states equally. 
The analysis that led to the inclusion of specific time controls in Model 7 also revealed that time 
is the second important exogenous factor in explaining the increase in renewable electricity 
generation across all states. Specifically, our analysis indicates that something was happening in 
the renewable energy industry after 2009 that affected all states equally but was not captured by 
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any other variables. It also implies that, even if all other variables in the model were held 
constant, renewable electricity generation would have increased due to time-fixed effects in these 
years. This is important for policymakers to note because it indicates that the list of variables in 
this study is not exhaustive and exogenous changes over time affect renewable energy. These 
fixed effects could potentially be capturing anything from federal policies to technological 
change. For example, the Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit (RPTC) a federal policy 
was expanded in 2009 (“DSIRE” 2017). While this study cannot conclusively attribute the 
increase in renewable energy in the years following this policy change to the RPTC or any other 
federal policy changes, it alerts policymakers to notice how any number of macro-level factors 
may affect renewable energy generation in U.S. states equally. Falling technology costs in the 
renewable energy industry could also have affected renewable energy generation in these years 
(“Soft Costs | Department of Energy”, 2017).  
Even though state- and time-fixed effects are controlled for in this study to isolate the 
policy variables of interest, it is still a significant finding that they are, in fact, an important part 
of the story and should be considered. Inappropriately modeled time effects in Table 5 (Model 5 
versus Models 6 and 7) show that RPS has a higher coefficient (though lower than in Table 4), 
and that the coal price coefficient is negative and only marginally significant, and natural gas 
price has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. These suggest that ignoring time-
specific factors would lead one to believe that RPS is more effective than it really is, and that 
increasing the price of coal and price of natural gas may be counterproductive in promoting 
renewable energy. 
Policy Variables 
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The key focus of the empirical analysis of this study was isolating the effect of different 
policies on percent renewable electricity generation in order to analyze their effectiveness. This 
is accomplished in the most basic way in Model 7 which controls for both time- and state-fixed 
effects. Model 8 further explores the effect of RPS policies on renewable generation through the 
inclusion of an experience variable and its interaction with RPS. Experience is defined as the log 
of the number of years a state has an RPS. (In results not shown, linear and quadratic RPS 
Experience terms were tested before settling on a logarithmic relationship). In Models 9 and 10, 
other variables are added as further controls.  
Model 7 shows that RPS and Natural gas price are significant and have the correct sign. 
The coefficient on RPS is positive and significant at the 99% confidence level and natural gas 
price is significant at the 95% confidence level. The only unexpected result was that the 
coefficient on coal price was negative, instead of positive. This finding was only significant at 
the 90% confidence level in Model 7, and is diminished to insignificant with the inclusion of 
more variables in later models. Overall, the results that RPS policies have a positive relationship 
with renewable energy and natural gas price has a negative relationship with renewable energy 
are consistent with the hypothesized relationships of these variables based on environmental 
economic theory. To interpret the magnitude of the RPS coefficient in Model 7, the value can 
simply be exponentiated and stated as: on average, RPS adoption can be expected to cause a 1.50 
percentage point increase in renewable energy. Indicating both CAC and MBI policies may be 
effective at increasing renewable electricity generation, spurring further analysis. 
In Model 8, RPS*Experience is found to have a positive and significant coefficient at the 
95% level. Also, it should be noted that when the interaction variable is included, the coefficient 
on RPS decreases in significance from 99% to 90%, and its magnitude decreases by about half. 
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The coefficients on RPS and RPS Experience are .171 and .201, respectively. The interpretation 
of the RPS and RPS Experience coefficients in Models 8, 9, and 10 are slightly more 
complicated because the marginal effect of RPS is always dependent on the level of experience.  
The marginal effect on REN can be calculated using the following formula E[REN/RPS=1, x]-
E(REN/RPS=0, x]) or  = 𝑒/0	  2345/6	  234	  789:;<=>:∗@A 234	  789:;<=>:  where 𝛽1 is the RPS 
coefficient and 𝛽2 is the RPS*Experience coefficient from each of the models (8,9,10). The 
resulting marginal effects of RPS are shown below Table 7. In other words, the marginal effect 
of RPS depends on how many years it has been adopted. Because RPS Experience follows a 
logarithmic trend each additional year of RPS Experience yields diminishing increases in percent 
renewable electricity generated in a state. This trend is illustrated in graphs below Table 7.  For 
example, in Model 10, the year after a state implements an RPS they experience an increase in 
REN of 1.33% however the total increase in renewable energy as a result of an RPS policy in its 
fourteenth year is only 2.06%. One possible explanation for why this type of trend is observed is 
that RPS policies mandate a goal of renewable energy to be met by a certain year. It is possible 
that in early years of a policy, when a state is far from its goal, it increases renewable energy 
generation at a fast rate by investing in large projects, but, as it approaches its goal, it invests in 
fewer of these types of projects. Consequently, the rate of increase in renewable energy 
generation slows.  
Models 9 and 10 help with the interpretation of the finding that the price of one fossil 
fuel, natural gas, was found to be positive as expected, but the other, coal, had the opposite sign. 
The coal and natural gas generation variables are used as controls because they are lagged 
variables that represent the fuel sources historically used in a state. It is expected that past fossil 
fuel generation is a good indicator of future fossil fuel generation because of the costs associated 
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with the technological change needed to move to renewable energy. In Model 9, it is found that 
fossil fuel generation is negative, but in Model 10, when the two main fossil fuels sources are 
added separately, only natural gas generation is significant and negative. According to economic 
theory if the goods were both substitutes, their prices should both be positively related to 
renewable energy, and their quantities negatively related. However, the results of this study 
suggest natural gas is in fact a substitute for renewable energy but coal may not be related in this 
way. Not only does coal behave unexpectedly, it is also much less significant. In Model 9, when 
fossil fuel generation is added to the model, coal price is negative but significant only at the 90% 
confidence level. But when fossil fuel generation is further broken down into coal and natural 
gas generation in Model 10, neither the price or quantity of coal is significant. This suggests that 
a tax on natural gas may be more effective at increasing renewable electricity generation. One 
possible explanation for this is that natural gas is a much cleaner fuel than coal so it may be a 
transitional step for states to move from coal to natural gas, before moving to renewable energy. 
Additional research on the electricity market, and on the substitutability between coal, natural 
gas and renewable fuels is beyond the scope of this study, but would be needed to confirm this 
two-step transition story (“Coal-To-Gas Plant Conversions in the U.S.” 2017). 
The results of this paper indicate that natural gas is more likely to be a substitute of 
renewable energy than coal. Therefore, a tax on natural gas could be effective at promoting 
renewable energy generation. The effect of the price of natural gas can be interpreted as the 
responsiveness of the renewable electricity generation in a state to an increase in natural gas 
price. The results in this study suggest that the response to a one dollar per Btu increase in the 
price of natural gas could cause anywhere from a 1.29 (Model 9) to 1.17 (Model 10) percentage 
point increase in renewable electricity generation in a given state. This response is smaller in 
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magnitude than the increase in renewable energy estimated for the first year a state has an RPS 
policy, which ranges from a 1.616 percentage point increase without controlling for past 
generation (Model 7) to 1.33 in the most controlled Model 10. In order to really compare these 
two policies to determine what would be more effective more information would be needed. 
Overall this study was able to demonstrate how a CAC policy like RPS and an MBI 
policy like a tax on natural gas price may be used to promote renewable energy generation. The 
results also suggest that the effectiveness of an RPS policy may diminish over time and the use 
of MBI policies may require greater understanding of the technical substitutability between 
energy sources in order to be effective. Overall, the sign and significance of the RPS and natural 
gas price confirm the general hypothesis made about CAC and MBI policies using the theoretical 
framework. 
Other Explanatory Variables 
Finally, other non-policy factors that could potentially affect renewable energy were 
evaluated and controlled for in this study through the inclusion of a group of non-policy 
variables. The variables included in the base models were the economic variables of population 
and mean household income as well as the demographic variable of Sierra Club membership and 
a political variable, LCV score. Electricity price was added later in Models 8-10 as an additional 
economic control. These variables were chosen because other studies have found them to be 
related to renewable energy generation (Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011) or because they were 
important controls to include in the model (Shrimali et al., 2015).  
In this study, the economic variables included in the base model are found to be positive 
and significant as hypothesized. Specifically, the coefficient on population ranged from 3.209 in 
Model 8 to 3.747 in Model 10 both at the 99% confidence level. The coefficient on median 
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household income was also found to be robustly significant across all models at the 95% 
confidence level. The final economic variable, retail electricity price was included because many 
other authors include it as a control. However, it is negative and insignificant in this study.  
The demographic and political variables included in this study are both proxies for 
government and citizen liberalism in a state. They were expected to be positively correlated with 
renewable energy, however they were not found to be significant in any models. Sierra Club 
membership is positive as expected, but is not significant, and LCV score has the opposite sign 
as expected, but is insignificant. One possible explanation for this finding is that the effects of 
citizen liberalism and government ideals are better captured by the state effects that are 
controlled for when fixed-effects estimation is used. This means their effects are combined in the 
state-specific intercepts that are all captured in the constant term in the output rather than in the 
individual political and demographic variables. The state-specific effects or intercepts (𝛼i) and a 
summary of their values are reported in Appendix A.2 (values generated based on Model 10). 
The values can be interpreted as how the real percent of renewable energy generated in a state 
differed from what was predicted by the model (“Panel Data Models - Econometrics Academy” 
2017). A quick glance at these values reveals that while they have a mean of about zero they are 
largely negative in less liberal states and largely positive in more liberal, environmentally 
minded states, generally indicating that some of these factors may be captured in this intercept 
term. Another potential criticism of the LCV variable that was found in this study and others to 
have a puzzling negative sign, is that while used widely in the literature, LCV score may not be 
the best indicator of state policies. The LCV score is based on votes made in the House and 
Senate regarding federal-level rather than local or state policies. Therefore, a state-level political 
variable may be better suited to capture political views that effect state-level legislation.  
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Conclusions and Discussion 
While the body of knowledge on both the market for renewable energy in the U.S. and 
the effectiveness of different renewable energy policies were broadened by this empirical 
analysis, in closing, the principal findings in this study that should be highlighted moving 
forward include the following key discoveries. First, the results suggest that state-fixed effects, 
time-fixed effects and macroeconomic indicators influence the level of renewable energy in a 
state. Second, RPS policies were found to have a positive and significant effect on renewable 
energy generation in a state, holding all other factors constant, suggesting that the command and 
control method of regulation is effective at promoting renewable energy generation in the U.S.. It 
is also concluded that RPS policies with fixed goals experience diminishing returns the longer 
they are in place. Lastly, this study yields the unique fining that an MBI policy in the form of an 
input tax on natural gas may be effective at promoting renewable energy generation if 
implemented.  
Overall, this study supports the idea that policy effectiveness at the state level can be 
successfully analyzed only by using models that include the correct controls and estimation 
methods that remove the many sources of bias that arise when modeling policy effectiveness 
across a heterogeneous sample of states over time. This study also provides evidence that under 
these conditions both CAC and MBI policies are found to be effective and have the expected 
result of promoting renewable energy as suggested by environmental economic theory.  
The first finding of this study regarding the importance of controlling for non-policy 
factors is both informed by and informs other literature. Estimation methods similar to the ones  
employed in this study were used by other authors in the past (Shrimali et al. 2015; Shrimali and 
Kniefel 2011; Carley 2009; Yin and Powers 2010). Among these other papers, specific non-
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policy variables were largely used as controls and not found to have a significant effect on 
renewable electricity generation, the exception being that economic variables were found to be 
consistently significant and important to include as additional controls. An opposing viewpoint 
to this is suggested by Delmas and Montes-Sancho, who argue that non-policy factors play an 
important role in the renewable electricity market (Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011). The 
results of this paper support the idea that controlling for exogenous factors using econometric 
methods should remove the significance of individual non-policy factors. This suggests that 
future analysis need not focus too heavily on non-policy variables such as demographic and 
political characteristics of states, but instead can simply control for them in the model through 
their estimation methods and focus on the primary goal further understanding renewable energy 
policy effectiveness.    
In early literature, the results regarding RPS policy effectiveness were mixed. However, 
over time as the body of literature on this topic grew the estimation techniques used by authors 
became more sophisticated, moving from simple OLS with cross-sectional data (Adelaja et al. 
2010) to very sophisticated panel data methods (Yin and Powers 2010; Zhao, Tang, and Wang 
2013; Shrimali et al. 2015). Findings that RPS policies are effective have become more common. 
In the more recent literature, the finding that RPS policies are effective renewable energy 
policies is becoming more commonly accepted. Additionally, many authors suggest that a 
measure of RPS stringency is important to truly understand RPS policy effectiveness.    
This study found RPS policies to be effective by simply differentiating between RPS 
policies using a dummy variable indicating implementation year and an experience measure, 
suggesting that the timing of a policy may be important to consider in further empirical work. 
This result is significant because it indicates that the RPS policies currently in place are effective 
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at increasing the percent of renewable energy generated in a state, providing valuable feedback 
to policymakers. The finding that states experience an increase in renewable energy each 
additional year that a state has an RPS policy is confirmed by Carley (2009). This study adds that 
the returns of each year may diminish over time. The next step to extend this study would be to 
include a stringency measure. Many authors provide detailed methods for how this can be done 
and their results are strongly positive (Shrimali et al. 2015; Yin and Powers 2010). It would be 
an extremely valuable extension to this study to add a stringency measure that further 
differentiates policies by criteria more sophisticated than year experience in order to see if the 
results of this study remained robust as well as investigate how the RPS experience variable is 
affected. 
Finally, the conclusion that an MBI policy in the form of an input tax on natural gas may 
be effective at increasing renewable energy generation is unique to this study. Related studies 
include results regarding the effectiveness of other MBI policies as well as some results 
regarding how coal and natural gas prices and quantities relate to renewable energy. With some 
creativity and caution, the MBI results from this study, although unique, may be compared to 
past finings. First, the previous finings regarding whether MBI policies are effective is largely 
mixed. Some authors find only some MBI policies to be effective; and the policies found to be 
significant differ between studies (Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2011; Shrimali et al. 2015). The 
findings in this paper add to these mixed results. It is even more difficult to find past results with 
which to compare the finding that an MBI policy in the form of a natural gas tax may be 
effective at increasing renewable energy generation because this is a unique approach. This is the 
first study that applies this method first used by (Jaffe and Stavins 1995) to the renewable energy 
industry. While various fossil fuel prices and quantity variables are included as controlled in 
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many studies in the literature they are included in different forms (percentages, prices, absolute 
quantities, etc.) and should be compared with caution. The results regarding these variables are 
also inconsistent throughout the literature and further analysis will need to be conducted to 
confirm or nullify the finding that an MBI policy, such as the fuel tax proposed in this study, 
may be effective at promoting renewable energy if adopted in the U.S. 
Overall, the empirical literature on this topic includes a wide range of studies that 
approach the problem of assessing the effectiveness of renewable energy policies uniquely. The 
results of this study make a significant contribution to the body of literature on this topic. The 
information gained in this study complements the existing literature and provides fresh insights 
that can also be considered by policymakers. Hopefully, the increased understanding of how 
economic policies can correct failures in the electricity market and effectively provide solutions 
to environmental problems will translate to a noticeable increase in the percent of electricity 
generated from renewable sources in the near future.  
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Tables  
 
Table 1: RPS Policies 
 










IA Alternative Energy Law 1.46% 
(105 mw) 
1983* 2% 1999 
MA Renewable Portfolio Standard 3.41% 1997 15% 2020 
NV Energy Portfolio Standard 3.54% 1997 25% 2025 
CT Renewables Portfolio Standard 2.98% 1998 27% 2020 
WI Renewable Portfolio Standard 1.88% 1998 10% 2015 
ME Renewables Portfolio Standard 19.56% 1999 40% 2017 
NJ Renewables Portfolio Standard 1.42% 1999 20.38% 2020 




1999* 4.4% 2015 
HI Renewable Portfolio Standard 4.66% 2001 100% 2045 
CA Renewables Portfolio Standard 12.71% 2002 50% 2030 
CO Renewable Energy Standard 0.53% 2004 30% 2020 
MD Renewable Energy Portfolio 
Standard 
1.13% 2004 25% 2020 
NM Renewables Portfolio Standard 1.56% 2004 20% 2020 
NY Renewable Portfolio Standard; 1.25% 2004 29% 2015 
PA Alternative Energy Portfolio 
Standard 
1.06% 2004 18% 2021 
RI Renewable Energy Standard 2.07% 2004 38.5% 2035 
DE Renewables Energy Portfolio 
Standard 
0% 2005 25% 2026 
MT Renewable Resource Standard 0.26% 2005 15% 2015 
AZ Renewable Energy Standard 0.05% 2006 15% 2025 
WA Renewable Energy Standard 2.31% 2006 15% 2020 
IL Renewable Portfolio Standard 0.64% 2007 25% 2026 
MN Renewables Energy Standard 7.22% 2007 26.5% 2025 
MO Renewable Electricity Standard 0.27% 2007 15% 2021 
NC Renewable Energy and Energy 
Efficiency Portfolio Standard 
1.29% 2007 12.5% 2021 
ND Renewable and Recycled Energy 
Objective 
2.03% 2007 10% 2015 
NH Electric Renewable Portfolio 
Standard 
4.82% 2007 24.8% 2025 
OR Renewable Portfolio Standard 4.05% 2007 50% 2040 
VA Voluntary Renewable Energy 
Portfolio Goal 
3.27% 2007 15% 2025 
MI Renewable Energy Standard 2.25% 2008 15% 2021 
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OH Alternative Energy Resource 
Standard 
0.41% 2008 12.5% 2026 
SD Renewable, Recycled and 
Conserved Energy Objective 
2.08% 2008 10% 2015 
UT Renewables Portfolio Goal 0.65% 2008 20% 2025 
KS Renewable Energy Goal 6.13% 2009 20% 2020 
WV Alternative and Renewable 
Energy Portfolio Standard 
0.19% 2009** 25% 2025 
OK Renewable Energy Goal 5.76% 2010 15% 2015 
IN Clean Energy Portfolio Goal 2.96% 2011 10% 2025 
SC Renewables Portfolio Standard 2.51% 2014 2% 2021 
VT Renewable Energy Standard 47% 2015*** 75% 2032 
* these states’ RPS specify generation goals in MW vs. a percent, the percent was calculated 
based on their baseline renewable electricity generation in the year policy was implemented 
(Carley 2009) 
** Repealed in 2015, but in place during the analyzed in this study 
*** Implemented after the time period analyzed in this study  
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Dependent      
REN Percent of net generation from 
renewable energy sources (excluding 
conventional hydroelectric) out of all 
electrical energy generated in the state.    
Logged Percent EIA _ 
Policy     
RPS Dummy=1 for years where state has an 
active RPS Policy, otherwise = 0 
Lagged 1 year DSIRE + 
RPS 
Experience  
The number of years a state has had an 
RPS policy, starting at 1 in 
implementation year and increasing by 
1for each additional year a policy is in 
place.  
Logged and Lagged 1 
year  
  
Coal Price Price of coal in the electric power 
sector 
Logged and Lagged 1 





Price of Natural Gas in the electric 
power sector 
Logged and Lagged 1 





Net electricity generation from fossil 
fuels, coal plus natural gas, All sectors 
Thousand megawatt 
hours 





Net electricity generation from Natural 
gas, All sectors 
Thousand megawatt 
hours 
Lagged 1 year 
EIA + 




Lagged 1 year 
EIA + 
     




Average retail price of electricity cents per kilowatt-hour 
Lagged 1 year 
EIA + 
Population Resident Population Not Seasonally 
Adjusted 





Real Median Household Income  Dollars  FRED + 
     
Demographic      
Sierra Club  Percent of state population that is a Logged Percent SC + 
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Mem Sierra Club member.  
     
Political      
LCV Score Average of Senate and House League 
of Conservation Voters Scores.  
Scores range from 0 to100, with 100 
being the most pro-environment.  
Range of numbers 1-100 LCV + 
Year 2001-2014    
StateID 1-50 US States Only     
* Some variables used in this study were transformed to improve the accuracy and interpretation 
of results. Variables were logged to improve their normality and others lagged to improve 
causality interpretation, some variables received both transformations. 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
Dependent      
REN 700 1.297 0.785 0 3.580 
Policy      
RPS 650 0.480 0.500 0 1 
RPS Experience  650 0.826 0.944 0 2.639 
Coal Price 650 0.989 0.360 0 1.777 
Natural Gas Price 650 1.837 0.382 0 2.550 
Fossil Fuel Gen      
Natural Gas Gen 650 17,415 33,859 0 213,901 
Coal Gen 650 37,272 36,298 0 157,897 
Economic      
Retail Electricity Price 650 8.955 3.511 4.240 34.04 
Population 700 15.13 1.012 13.11 17.47 
Median HH Income 700 55,488 8,620 32,905 80,007 
Demographic      
Sierra Club Mem 700 0.190 0.0965 0.0351 0.515 
Political      
LCV Score 700 48 28.87 0 100 
Time      
Year 700 2,008 4.034 2,001 2,014 
StateID 700 25.50 14.44 1 50 
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Table 4: Results Models 1-4 
 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) 
 Pooled OLS Random 
Effects 
Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Robust 
VARIABLES REN REN REN REN 
     
Policy     
     
RPS 0.652*** 0.605*** 0.506*** 0.506*** 
 (0.0630) (0.0507) (0.0478) (0.119) 
Coal Price 0.0914 0.809*** 0.268** 0.268 
 (0.0860) (0.103) (0.118) (0.235) 
Natural Gas Price -0.0849 -0.124** -0.140*** -0.140** 
 (0.0729) (0.0565) (0.0526) (0.0609) 
Economic     
     
Population -0.0968*** -0.0367 5.063*** 5.063*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0900) (0.501) (1.102) 
Median HH Income -1.44e-05*** 1.56e-05*** 2.03e-05*** 2.03e-05** 
 (3.88e-06) (5.06e-06) (5.05e-06) (8.36e-06) 
Demographic     
     
Sierra Club Mem 2.189*** -1.360** -0.811 -0.811 
 (0.398) (0.534) (0.593) (1.047) 
Political     
     
LCV Score -0.00120 -0.00179 -0.00268** -0.00268 
 (0.00126) (0.00127) (0.00126) (0.00242) 
Constant 2.990*** 0.499 -76.38*** -76.38*** 
 (0.468) (1.378) (7.550) (16.72) 
     
Observations 650 650 650 650 
Number of stateID  50 50 50 
Rho  0.749 0.996 0.996 
R2   0.836 0.836 
Adjusted  R2   0.821 0.821 






 Chi2 = 83.53  
Prob>Chi2 <0.001 
Modified Wald  
Chi2 = 4315.43 
Prob>Chi2 <0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Results Models 4-7 
 
 (Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6) (Model 7) 




Time Dummy Time Period 2  
Dummies 
VARIABLES REN REN REN REN 
     
Policy     
     
RPS 0.506*** 0.434*** 0.453*** 0.480*** 
 (0.119) (0.115) (0.113) (0.113) 
Coal Price 0.268 -0.575* -0.742** -0.401* 
 (0.235) (0.291) (0.330) (0.218) 
Natural Gas 
Price 
-0.140** -0.114** 0.259** 0.224** 
 (0.0609) (0.0551) (0.115) (0.0928) 
Economic     
     
Population 5.063*** 2.755** 2.799** 3.273*** 






 (8.36e-06) (8.06e-06) (9.09e-06) (8.99e-06) 
Demographic     
     
Sierra Club Mem -0.811 0.305 1.357 0.372 
 (1.047) (1.206) (1.388) (1.168) 
Political     
     
LCV Score -0.00268 -0.00184 -0.00115 -0.000172 
 (0.00242) (0.00240) (0.00267) (0.00255) 
Time     
     
Trend  0.0731***   
  (0.0218)   
Time Dummies     
     
Year = 2003   0.0579*  
   (0.0324)  
Year = 2004   0.00600  
   (0.0451)  
Year = 2005   -0.0529  
   (0.0815)  
Year = 2006   -0.0321  
   (0.112)  
Year = 2007   0.0455  
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   (0.127)  
Year = 2008   0.169  
   (0.154)  
Year = 2009   0.291  
   (0.217)  
Year = 2010   0.530** 0.313*** 
   (0.229) (0.0906) 
Year = 2011   0.636** 0.410*** 
   (0.248) (0.103) 
Year = 2012   0.748*** 0.499*** 
   (0.271) (0.120) 
Year = 2013   0.878*** 0.621*** 
   (0.276) (0.141) 
Year = 2014   0.883*** 0.641*** 
   (0.270) (0.128) 
Constant -76.38*** -41.49** -42.92** -49.94*** 
 (16.72) (20.03) (19.63) (16.79) 
     
Observations 650 650 650 650 
Number of 
stateID 
50 50 50 50 
Rho 0.996 0.988 0.989 0.992 
R2 0.836 0.852 0.861 0.855 
Adjusted R2 0.821 0.838 0.845 0.840 
  Joint F-Test Ho: All years =0 
F= 5.87 
Prob > F < 0.0001 
Joint F-Test Ho: Time 1 =0 
F= 2.81 
Prob > F = 0.0154 
Joint F-Test Ho: Time 2 =0 
F= 5.62 
Prob > F = 0.0004 
Ho: 2010.year =2011.year 
  F= 11.81, Prob > F 
=0.0016 
  Ho: 2011.year = 
2012.year 
  F= 9.08, Prob > F = 
0.0041 
  Ho: 2012.year = 
2013.year 
  F= 6.64, Prob > F = 
0.0131 
  Ho 2013.year = 2014.year 
  F= 0.01, Prob > F = 
0.9097 
   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Results Models 4, 7-10 
 




Robust FE  
Time 
Controlled 









Natural gas  
VARIABLES REN REN REN REN REN 
      
Policy      
      
RPS 0.506*** 0.480*** 0.271* 0.258* 0.283** 
 (0.119) (0.113) (0.140) (0.140) (0.135) 
RPS Experience    0.201** 0.191** 0.167* 
   (0.0925) (0.0909) (0.0856) 
Coal Price  0.268 -0.401* -0.424* -0.391* -0.170 
 (0.235) (0.218) (0.217) (0.210) (0.214) 
Natural Gas  -0.140** 0.224** 0.231** 0.256*** 0.160* 
 (0.0609) (0.0928) (0.0943) (0.0910) (0.0821) 
Fossil Fuel Gen     -7.22e-06**  
    (3.22e-06)  
Natural Gas Gen     -1.16e-05*** 
     (3.48e-06) 
Coal Gen     4.63e-06 
     (5.24e-06) 
Economic      
      
Retail Electricity Price   -0.00843 -0.00980 -0.00771 
   (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0112) 
Population 5.063*** 3.273*** 3.209*** 3.644*** 3.747*** 
 (1.102) (1.112) (1.105) (1.151) (1.112) 





 (8.36e-06) (8.99e-06) (8.84e-06) (8.70e-06) (8.17e-06) 
Demographic      
      
Sierra Club Mem -0.811 0.372 1.062 0.961 1.197 
 (1.047) (1.168) (1.237) (1.233) (1.168) 
Political      
      
LCV Score -0.00268 -0.000172 -0.000274 -0.000348 -0.000339 
 (0.00242) (0.00255) (0.00238) (0.00234) (0.00222) 
Time      
      
Time period 2 Year  +*** +*** +*** +*** 
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Dummies  
  (0.0906) (0.0899) (0.0921) (0.0898) 
Constant -76.38*** -49.94*** -48.99*** -55.19*** -57.04*** 
 (16.72) (16.79) (16.68) (17.30) (16.70) 
      
Observations 650 650 650 650 650 
Number of stateID 50 50 50 50 50 
R2 0.836 0.855 0.860 0.862 0.870 
Adjusted R2 0.821 0.840 0.845 0.847 0.855 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  




Marginal effect of RPS for every year of Experience with RPS 
Year Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
1 1.31% 1.29% 1.33% 
2 1.51% 1.48% 1.49% 
3 1.64% 1.6% 1.59% 
4 1.73% 1.69% 1.67% 
5 1.81% 1.76% 1.74% 
6 1.88% 1.82% 1.79% 
7 1.94% 1.88% 1.84% 
8 1.99% 1.93% 1.88% 
9 2.04% 1.97% 1.92% 
10 2.08% 2.01% 1.95% 
11 2.12% 2.05% 1.98% 
12 2.16% 2.08% 2.01% 
13 2.2% 2.11% 2.04% 





























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
B3 Model 8
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Appendix 
Table A.1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Fixed Effects Fixed Effects Fixed Effects 
 within LSDV Robust FE Base Model 
VARIABLES REN REN REN 
    
Policy    
    
RPS 0.506*** 0.506*** 0.506*** 
 (0.119) (0.0530) (0.0530) 
Coal Price 0.268 0.268** 0.268** 
 (0.235) (0.110) (0.110) 
Natural Gas Price -0.140** -0.140** -0.140** 
 (0.0609) (0.0558) (0.0558) 
Economic    
    
Population 5.063*** 5.063*** 5.063*** 
 (1.102) (0.556) (0.556) 
Median HH Income 2.03e-05** 2.03e-05*** 2.03e-05*** 
 (8.36e-06) (4.99e-06) (4.99e-06) 
Demographic    
    
Sierra Club Mem -0.811 -0.811 -0.811 
 (1.047) (0.593) (0.593) 
Political    
    
LCV Score -0.00268 -0.00268** -0.00268** 
 (0.00242) (0.00130) (0.00130) 
group(abbreviation) = 2  -8.473***  
  (1.052)  
group(abbreviation) = 3  -5.556***  
  (0.796)  
group(abbreviation) = 4  -10.91***  
  (1.245)  
group(abbreviation) = 5  -17.75***  
  (2.260)  
group(abbreviation) = 6  -8.650***  
  (1.146)  
group(abbreviation) = 7  -7.772***  
  (0.926)  
group(abbreviation) = 8  -0.906***  
  (0.185)  
group(abbreviation) = 9  -15.41***  
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  (1.818)  
group(abbreviation) = 10  -11.96***  
  (1.452)  
group(abbreviation) = 11  -2.046***  
  (0.424)  
group(abbreviation) = 12  -5.535***  
  (0.865)  
group(abbreviation) = 13  -1.442***  
  (0.500)  
group(abbreviation) = 14  -13.97***  
  (1.636)  
group(abbreviation) = 15  -10.63***  
  (1.235)  
group(abbreviation) = 16  -5.598***  
  (0.814)  
group(abbreviation) = 17  -8.725***  
  (1.012)  
group(abbreviation) = 18  -8.056***  
  (1.036)  
group(abbreviation) = 19  -10.45***  
  (1.274)  
group(abbreviation) = 20  -10.35***  
  (1.189)  
group(abbreviation) = 21  -0.350  
  (0.398)  
group(abbreviation) = 22  -12.32***  
  (1.490)  
group(abbreviation) = 23  -8.174***  
  (1.168)  
group(abbreviation) = 24  -10.60***  
  (1.203)  
group(abbreviation) = 25  -5.853***  
  (0.785)  
group(abbreviation) = 26  -0.614**  
  (0.267)  
group(abbreviation) = 27  -12.26***  
  (1.445)  
group(abbreviation) = 28  1.647***  
  (0.199)  
group(abbreviation) = 29  -3.968***  
  (0.566)  
group(abbreviation) = 30  -1.890***  
  (0.395)  
group(abbreviation) = 31  -12.63***  
  (1.413)  
group(abbreviation) = 32  -3.905***  
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  (0.656)  
group(abbreviation) = 33  -5.288***  
  (0.755)  
group(abbreviation) = 34  -15.48***  
  (1.849)  
group(abbreviation) = 35  -13.95***  
  (1.566)  
group(abbreviation) = 36  -6.967***  
  (0.944)  
group(abbreviation) = 37  -6.554***  
  (1.016)  
group(abbreviation) = 38  -14.10***  
  (1.621)  
group(abbreviation) = 39  -1.155***  
  (0.354)  
group(abbreviation) = 40  -8.364***  
  (1.026)  
group(abbreviation) = 41  0.907***  
  (0.236)  
group(abbreviation) = 42  -10.26***  
  (1.211)  
group(abbreviation) = 43  -17.00***  
  (1.976)  
group(abbreviation) = 44  -6.438***  
  (0.777)  
group(abbreviation) = 45  -11.31***  
  (1.355)  
group(abbreviation) = 46  3.234***  
  (0.183)  
group(abbreviation) = 47  -9.946***  
  (1.299)  
group(abbreviation) = 48  -9.594***  
  (1.189)  
group(abbreviation) = 49  -4.476***  
  (0.552)  
group(abbreviation) = 50  2.683***  
  (0.202)  
Constant -76.38*** -69.00*** -76.38*** 
 (16.72) (7.507) (8.449) 
    
Observations 650 650 650 
R-squared 0.565 0.836 0.836 
Number of stateID 50   
Adjusted r2   0.821 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.2 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLE N mean sd min max 𝛼i  650 1.07e-08 3.815 -6.6125 7.324 
Note: A state’s renewable energy generation was underestimated by the model if it has a positive intercept 
(𝛼i) and overestimated if it has a negative intercept (𝛼i). 




WY 7.324900627 6 0.189 
VT 7.284371376 94 0.505 
ND 6.580777168 55 0.105 
SD 6.387945652 42 0.104 
ME 5.568994999 75 0.320 
AK 5.520057201 16 0.242 
MT 4.699974537 33 0.239 
DE 4.595984459 83 0.203 
ID 4.448876858 10 0.169 
HI 4.276571274 87 0.352 
NH 4.115595818 54 0.336 
RI 4.01326561 91 0.244 
NE 2.413386583 18 0.108 
NM 2.26088953 61 0.364 
MS 1.837480783 22 0.045 
NV 1.753294349 47 0.184 
WV 1.65626514 61 0.107 
AR 1.600476623 43 0.090 
KS 1.373980522 15 0.156 
IA 1.216985941 46 0.183 
OK 0.809846222 8 0.084 
UT 0.500235558 15 0.166 
OR 0.380505353 77 0.543 
LA 0.316122293 25 0.073 
AL -0.446072966 15 0.074 
CT -0.447321892 88 0.281 
SC -0.521702886 25 0.119 
MN -0.789771199 66 0.350 
CO -1.302559614 48 0.396 
KY -1.401363373 15 0.114 
WI -2.036288261 68 0.252 
WA -2.160967827 77 0.416 
TN -2.211441994 26 0.107 
MA -2.327684641 87 0.343 
MD -2.58198452 87 0.264 
AZ -2.73140502 27 0.203 
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IN -2.838331699 36 0.117 
VA -2.846674442 42 0.206 
MO -2.890740395 31 0.160 
GA -3.178275585 23 0.121 
MI -3.77175808 68 0.190 
NC -3.803062677 37 0.180 
NJ -3.918908119 80 0.226 
FL -4.897697926 48 0.163 
TX -5.403676033 19 0.096 
IL -5.404586315 62 0.193 
PA -5.414482594 44 0.203 
OH -5.49647665 39 0.160 
NY -5.500959873 82 0.207 
CA -6.612589359 77 0.471 
